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Abstract 
Masqueraders  are  a  category  of  intruders  who  impersonate  other 
people  on  a  computer  system  and  use  this  entry  point  to  use  the 
information  stored  in  the  systems  or  throw  other  attacks  into  the 
network. This paper focuses on Ensemble Design of a Masquerader 
Detection System using Decision trees and Support Vector Machines 
for classification with two kernel functions linear and linear BSpline. 
The key idea is to find out specific patterns of command sequence that 
tells  about  user  behaviour  on  a  system,  and  use  them  to  build 
classifiers  that  can  perfectly  recognize  anomalous  and  normal 
behaviour. Real time truncated command line data set collected from 
a  debian  Linux  server  is  used  for  performance  comparison  of  the 
developed classifiers with the standard truncated command line data 
set  of  Schonlau[4].  The  results  show  that  Ensemble  Design  of 
Masquerader  Detection  Systems  is  much  faster  than  individual 
Decision trees or Support Vector Machines.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion  detection:  the  most  effective  way  to  detect 
intrusions is by using the audit data generated by the operating 
system. Since almost all activities are logged on a system, it is 
possible  that  a  manual  inspection  of  these  logs  would  allow 
intrusions to be detected. It important to analyze the audit data 
even  after  an  attack  has  occurred  to  determine  the  extent  of 
damage sustained this analysis also helps in tracking down the 
attacks and in recording the attacks patterns for future detection. 
A good Intrusion Detection that can be used to analyze audit 
data makes a valuable tool for information systems. 
The idea behind anomaly detection is to establish each user‟s 
normal activity profile as possible intrusion attempts.  A  main 
issue concerning misuse detection is how to develop signatures 
that include all possible attacks to avoid false negatives, and how 
to develop signatures that do not match non-intrusive activities 
to avoid false positive. Through false negatives are frequently 
considered  more  serious,  the  selection  of  threshold  levels  is 
important so that neither of the above problems is unreasonably 
magnified. 
A masquerade attack in which one user impersonates another 
is one of types of computer abuse, largely because such attacks 
are often mounted by insiders and can be very difficult to detect. 
Automatic discovery of masqueraders is sometimes undertaken 
by detecting significant departures from normal user behavior, as 
represented by user profiles based on users command histories. 
Masquerading  is  the  act  of  substituting  oneself  for  another 
Masquerading will be to disguise by assuming the appearance of 
someone or not. Sometimes  it  will be furnishing  with a  false 
appearance or an assumed identity or obscure the existence or 
true state or character of something. The computer masquerade 
problem can be explained in the following scenario. A legitimate 
user  takes  a  coffee  break,  leaving  his/her  terminal  open  and 
logged in during the users absence, an interloper assumes control 
of the keyboard, and enters commands, taking advantage of the 
legitimate user‟s privileges and access to programs and data. 
Specifically, our motivation is from three facts of Intrusion 
Detection community. First systems that embedded in hosts of a 
network should react quickly to drifting normal behaviors e.g. 
user behavior reveals particular regularity during a period, but it 
might change to another pattern because of tasks at hand.Under 
such case, systems should undergo the changing and thus update 
the normal profile it has established. Second Intrusion Detection 
is a real time-critical mission with the ability to identify attack at 
the moment it happens, and thus systems should be capable of 
rapid response, both learning time and running time should be as 
short as possible while keeping high detection accuracy. Third 
because  systems  are  embedded  in  the  hosts,  they  run  as  a 
background task with little computational overhead, rather than a 
foreground  application  needs  considerable  resource  cost,  less 
processing  memory  and  simpler  operating  environment 
characterization. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Intrusion can be defined as any unauthorized access to the 
legal network using any of the backdoors or using a legitimate 
user‟s  identity  Intrusions  are  divided  in  [1]  into  8  basic 
categories: 1. Eves dropping and packet sniffing: sniffing is done 
by  turning  the  Network  Interface  card  of  the  machine  into 
promiscuous  mode  and  thereby  capturing  all  the  information 
passing  through  the  network  even  though  the  packets  are  not 
intended  for  that  machine.  So  if  an  attacker  gets  access  to  a 
particular machine he can get all the packets passing through the 
network.  2.  Snooping  and  downloading:  Downloading  the 
content which is restricted in that domain by using some other 
proxy servers. 3. Tampering or data diddling: The data passing 
from  machine  a  to  machine  b  is  interrupted  in  between  and 
truncated to some other machine in the network. 4. Spoofing:    
Artificially  spoofing  the  IP  address  of  the  machine  in  the 
network  and  getting  all  the  information  intended  for  that 
machine. 5. Jamming, Flooding: sending continuous requests to 
the server sothat it can‟t respond to authorized user requests. 6. 
Masquerading:  Impersonating  other  users  in  the  network  and 
using  all  the  resources  intended  for  the  users.  7.  Exploiting 
Vulnerabilities: finding out and using vulnerabilities like honey 
nets in the network. 8. Password Cracking and keys: cracking 
the passwords of the users and using them for personal use. 
The audit data is generated [10] using UNIX acct auditing 
mechanism. The data generated will have the fields command 
name, user, terminal, start time, end time, real, CPU, memory 
usage  (K)  among  these  the  first  two  fields  are  used  in  this T. SUBBULAKSHMI et.al. : ENSEMBLE DESIGN OF MASQUERADER DETECTION SYSTEMS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 
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research. The first 15,000 commands of 70 users are collected. 
The time span of command collection differs for each user. The 
data is decomposed into 150 blocks of 100 commands each. The 
blocks  51  through  150  contain  contaminated  blocks.  It  is 
assumed that either a block is contaminated completely or not at 
all. There are no mixed blocks Six methods are used. 
Unix command data was collected in [4] from 50 users and 
this  is  used  as  benchmark  in  evaluating  IDS  using  command 
sequences. Results of the six methods uniqueness, Bayes one-
step  markov,  Hybrid  Multi-step  Markov,  Compression, 
Sequence-Match,  incremental  probabilistic  action  modeling 
shows that the false negatives is very low i.e. within the interval 
(1-7). The missing alarms fall in the range of (30-60%). 
Number  of  six  different  statistical  approaches  was  [4] 
presented for detecting intrusions with commands of 50 users 
including  two  from  the  computer  science  community.  The 
experiments shows that a total of 40 masquerader incidents for 
the 50 users which accounts for 474% of data. There were at 
most  three  incidents  for  any  users  and  21  users  were  no 
masqueraders at all. Half the masqueraders were present for four 
or fewer blocks while three masqueraders were present for three 
blocks.  The  results  are  presented  along  with  performance  of 
selected  individuals,  correlation  methods,  ROC  curves  with 
survival  analysis  of  intrusions  and  ROC  curves  without 
updating. Finally each  method  is discussed  with it‟s pros and 
cons. The complexity and scale of the problem is discussed. 
This  approach  described  in  [11]  shows  some  results 
concerning  the  generalization  and  robustness  capabilities  of 
Machine  learning  algorithms  in  creating  user  profiles  for 
anomaly detection based on classification of artificially created 
Unix command line arguments. The hybrid approach begins with 
applying  Expert  Fuzzy  rules  to  reduce  the  dimensionality  of 
data, followed by initial clustering of the data and refinement by 
LVQ. Since LVQ is an nearest neighbor classifier, a new record 
which  lies  outside  a  specified  distance  is  classified  as 
masquerader. So anomalous records need not be included in the 
training data. A four step approach is followed. 
Common test parameter settings are given as: Commands in 
each user record: 100, training sample size: 1875 records (75% 
of  available  records),  legitimate  user  test  sample  size:  625 
records (25%), Anomaly records: 200, LVQ: 002  with 50000 
iterations the results are shown for three tests which show they 
seem lackluster and this approach merits future consideration. 
A highly effective approach to masquerader detection [12] 
using Hidden Markov Models is presented, also a formulation is 
presented to calculate the effectiveness of masquerade detection 
with Schonlau‟s dataset Detection rate is the ratio of dirty blocks 
to total number of dirty blocks in the dataset. False positive rate 
is the ratio of number of clean blocks classified as dirty blocks to 
total number of clean blocks. According to Maxicon R The cost 
of masquerade detection is defined as cost = 6 X FPR + (100-
DR).  In  this  paper  a  formula  to  calculate  the  effectiveness  is 
given Effectiveness = (1-ʱ) * DR + ʱ * FPR.  The value of ʱ = 
02 is fair. This formula adds weight to DR while enhancing the 
FPR. 
A novel anomaly detection is proposed in [13] for targeting 
masquerades  based  upon  unpopular  and  uniquely  used 
commands. An SGI server running on IRIX 62 is used for data 
collection  of  10,000  commands  of  53  users.  They  are  further 
divided  into  training  data  sets  of  5,000  commands  and  test 
datasets of 1,000 commands. The 1,000 test data sets are further 
divided into 2 replications of 500 commands or 10 replications 
of 100 commands. A test statistic is defined based on unpopular 
and unique commands with their weight and uniqueness index. 
The  uniqueness  method  used  in  this  paper  is  based  on  the 
assumption that commands not used by the common community 
of  user  are  indicative  of  the  masquerader.  This  conceptually 
simple approach reports false alarm rate of 5% corresponds to 
10% missing alarms based on 100 commands about 2% based on 
500 commands and about 1% based on 1000 commands i.e., The 
user  can  be  easily  distinguished  as  the  test  data  sequence  is 
larger.  
SVM  based  Masquerader  detection  [14]  was  done  with 
truncated  and  enriched  command  data  sets.  The  concept  of 
common  commands  was  introduced  to  reflect  the  diverse 
command  patterns  exhibited  by  different  users.  Truncated 
command  lines  detects  the  Masquerades  801%  and  948% 
(pervious  study  results:  693%  and  628%)  of  the  time  and 
Enriched  command  lines  detects  the  masquerades  873  % 
(pervious study results: 821%). The architecture proposed in this 
paper  includes  creation  of  Audit  DB,  data  preprocessing  and 
feature selection module, classification with voting engine, SVM 
kernel and parameter selection and the actual experiments with 
truncated  and  enriched  command  lines  with  the  common 
command  assigned  with  threshold  values.  The  experiments 
convincingly demonstrate that SVM[15] is an effective approach 
for masquerader detection. The false alarm rates can be further 
reduced  by  considering  additional  factors  like  CPU  usage, 
memory usage and file access. 
Shonlau‟s  work  is  extended  in  [2]  and  the  sequences  of 
truncated command lines is  classified into two categories self 
and non self using an algorithm inspired by Naïve Bayes. The 
truncated data of 15,000 commands from 50 users is configured 
in two ways. The first one is the SEA configuration which is 
used by Shonlau where there are randomly injected commands 
from  users  outside  the  50  user  community.  The  second  one 
which is used in this paper is lv49 configuration where each user 
is crossed with every other user to compare the effects of every 
user acting as a masquerader against all other users So the paper 
focuses  on  determining  the  performance  improvement  in 
Detection rate of a new classifier and to provide a detailed error 
analysis.  The  performance  is  assessed  by  applying  a  cost 
function of the form. 
Cost = ʱ (Misses) + β (False alarms) 
where ʱ = β = 1 to give equal weight to misses and False alarms 
So the cost function becomes 
Cost = Misses + False alarms 
Maxicon  and  Townsend‟s  work  is  extended  [3]  by  using 
enriched command lines and increases the detection rate by 82% 
with corresponding 30% reduction in overall cost of errors and a 
small increase in false alarms. Enriched command lines are the 
commands  with  all  arguments  ,  options,  flags  or  elements  of 
shell  grammar  such  as  pipes  and  semicolons  Examples  of 
enriched and truncated command lines are clearly given. Then 
the  two  experimental  methods  were  discussed  along  with 
selection of subjects for data collection, selection of training and 
test data and the detection algorithm.   ISSN: 2229 – 6956(ONLINE)                                                         ICTACT JOURNAL ON SOFT COMPUTING, JANUARY 2011, ISSUE: 03 
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3. AUDIT SOURCE 
3.1.  SHONLAU’S  STANDARD  TRUNCATED 
COMMAND SEQUENCES  
The Audit  source  for our experiments is derived from the 
Truncated  command  sequences  of  Schonlau[4].  Data  set  is 
collected  with seeded  masquerading  users to compare various 
Masquerader  detection  methods.  The  data  set  consist  of  50 
records  representing  to  one  user  each  record  contains  15,000 
commands. The audit data is generated with unix_acct. The first 
5000 commands for each user do not contain any masqueraders 
and are intended as training data. The next 10,000 commands 
can be thought of as 100 blocks of 100 commands each. So a 
single  user  has  100  blocks  of  commands.  Every  block  is 
represented  using  a  score  of  „0‟  or  „1‟.    „0‟  means  that  the 
corresponding  100  commands  are  not  contaminated  by  a 
masquerader „1‟ means they are contaminated. This 100 values 
form  the  first  row  of  a  matrix  and  the  other  users  are  also 
represented in the same way. Finally the complete matrix will 
have the size of 50x100 which will represent the scores of the 
blocks. The first 50 blocks are used for building the model using 
Training  and  the  next  100  blocks  are  used  for  testing  the 
developed model.  
3.2  REAL  TIME  TRUNCATED  COMMAND  LINE 
DATA 
A debian Linux server connected with 125 nodes using 100 
users  is  used  for  real  time  truncated  command  line  data 
collection. The data collection is done for two months period All 
the 100 users were observed initially. The 100 users are from 
various groups 60 Students, 10 Research scholars, 7 scientists, 
14 academic staff of that organization and 9 novice users are 
observed.  After 15 days the less active 50 users were eliminated 
and only the active 50 users were taken into account. A total of 
15000 commands were collected for each and every user first the 
raw  commands  are  filtered  for  their  arguments,  pipes  and 
options.  Record  for  each  and  every  user  is  created  with  only 
truncated command lines. The commands are divided into blocks 
of command size 100. Now all the 50 users are having a record 
with 150 blocks of 100 commands each. The windows ASCII 
file  is  created  to  represent  whether  the  block  is  normal  or 
anomalous. The first 50 blocks are used for building the model 
using Training and the next 100 blocks are used for testing the 
developed model.  
4. DECISION TREES FOR CLASSIFICATION 
Decision tree is made of decision nodes and leaf nodes Each 
decision node corresponds to a test X over a single attribute of 
the input data and a number of branches, each of which handles 
an outcome of the test X Each leaf node represents a class that is 
the result of decision for a case. The idea of constructing the 
decision  tree  is  „divide  and  conquer  technique‟.  A  set  T  of 
training data consists of k classes (c1, c2…ck). If T only consists 
of cases of one single class, T will be a leaf. If T contains no 
case, T is a leaf and associated class with this leaf is the default 
class of parent node. If T contains cases of mixed classes, then T 
will be divided into n subsets based on the test of some attribute 
of the training data. The process is continues until every subset 
belongs to a single class. The major issue here is to choose the 
attribute  which  acts  as  the  best  classifier.  This  is  done  by 
calculating  the  information  gain  of  each  attribute  using  the 
entropy of each attribute. The attribute with highest information 
gain is chosen as the classifier. Once the decision tree is built it 
can be used to classify the test data which has the same features 
as the training data.  
5.  DECISION  TREES  FOR  MASQUERADER 
CLASSIFICATION  
Decision trees are capable of classifying large datasets. The 
classification process starts from the top of the decision tree. The 
process  of  finding  the  root  node  is  done  by  calculating  the 
information  gain  of  the  attributes  block  score,  command 
frequency and block type. 
The steps in classification process are as follows  
5.1. Assigning scores for blocks  
5.2. Calculating the command frequency 
5.3. Design of Decision tree classifier  
5.1 ASSIGNING SCORES FOR BLOCKS  
The  block  score  is  calculated  from  the  random  values 
assigned for each command and it belongs to any of the three 
values low, medium and high. 
5.2  CALCULATING  THE  COMMAND 
FREQUENCY  
The command frequency of the block is also calculated based 
on the no of occurrence of that command in the block which 
belongs to upper or lower threshold levels. 
5.3 DESIGN OF DECISION TREE CLASSIFIER  
The structure of the decision node is closely related to the 
performance of the developed classifier. So it is very important 
to determine the structure of the tree according to the training 
samples and their attribute values. To have better classification 
accuracy more separable classes based on their information gain 
should be classified as upper nodes of the decision tree.  
The  entropy  is  the  maximum  number  of  bits  needed  to 
encode  class  (I  or  II)  of  randomly  drawn  member  of  S  So 
Entropy S can be defined as  
Entropy (S)   – pI log2 pI – pII log2pII 
The  information  gain  of  a  particular  attribute  can  be 
calculated as the expected reduction in entropy due to sorting on 
attribute A. 
 
 (A)   Values v
v
v ) (S Entropy  
| S |
| S |
  -   Entropy(S)     A)   (S, Gain   
The process of training is the process of forming the decision 
tree The Gain (S, A) is calculated for the attributes block score, 
command frequency and block type It is found that block score 
has the highest of all values. So the decision tree is formed by 
choosing  the  block  score  as  the  root  node.  The  block  type  is 
taken  from  the  windows  ASCII  file  which  is  of  type 
masquerader  of  non-masquerader.  A  sample  decision  tree  is T. SUBBULAKSHMI et.al. : ENSEMBLE DESIGN OF MASQUERADER DETECTION SYSTEMS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 
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illustrated  in  Fig.1.  For  training  the  first  5000  commands  of 
Shonlau‟s standard command and Real time data is taken. When 
learning  of  the  decision  tree  classifier  is  completed  using  the 
training data, the next 10,000 commands of the standard and real 
time data were given as test data to test its performance. The 
results are shown in Table.1 for a representative set of users.  
Table.1. Classification Results of Decision Tree Classifiers (SD 
– Standard Data, RTD – Real Time Data) 
Sl.No  User 
Classification 
Accuracy 
SD  RTD 
1  User 3  98.13  99.15 
2  User 14  51.31  49.37 
3  User 21  62.37  72.19 
4  User 24  100.00  85.41 
5  User 38  99.58  79.42 
6  User 41  100.00  98.48 
 
Fig.1. Decision Tree Classifier 
6. SVM FOR CLASSIFICATION 
Statistical  theory  was  first  started  by  Vapnik  and 
chervonenkis  in  the  sixties.  The  data  model  generated  by  an 
unknown stochastic regularity is observed. Learning is done by 
extracting regularity from the data the analysis of the learning 
problem leads to notation of the capacity of the function classes 
that  a  learning  machine  can  implement,  the  supporter  vector 
machines use a particular type of function class classifiers with 
large “margins” in a feature space induced by a kernal. 
In support vector machines there are two sets, input set and 
output  set.  Input  set  is  represented  by  X  and  Output  set  is 
represented by Y. The training set (x1, y1 )…(xm, ym ) ε X×Y. 
Generalization is to find a suitable y ε Y, given a previously 
unseen x ε X, where (x, y) should be similar to (x1, y1)… (xm, 
ym). The objective is to Classify the points X = ʦ (x) in feature 
space according to which of the two class means is closure. 

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7.  SVM  FOR  MASQUERADER 
CLASSIFICATION 
A new method is proposed for classifying the masquerader 
using Support Vector Machines The Standard dataset is taken 
first and classified using the method proposed in this paper and 
the  real  time  dataset  is  taken  and  fed  to  the  classifier  The 
classification  thus  obtained  gives  the  actual  measure  of 
classification  of  the  classifier  The  steps  in  the  classification 
process are  
 Data Pre-processing 
 Selection of Kernal  Function and parameters 
 Design of SVM Classifier 
7.1. DATA PRE-PROCESSING 
The training data for our experiment is taken from schonlau 
dataset is a collection of 50 files representing to one user each 
file  contains  15,000  commands.  The  unique  commands  are 
derived from the 50 files representing the 15000 commands of 
each  user  Random  values  are  assigned  for  each  unique 
command. Each user file is individually taken and assigned with 
the previously determined random values for the commands. The 
last 10000 commands are taken and divided into blocks of 50 
commands each. Two blocks are combined to form the training 
input X of Size 100x2. The training target Y of size 100x1 is 
formed  from  the  windows  ASCII  file  of  the  dataset.  Each 
column of the ASCII file corresponds to one of the 50 users. 
Values in each row correspond to a pair of 50 commands. The 
values of Y are +1, -1; +1 is for masquerading block and -1 is 
for non- masquerading block. This process is repeated for all the 
50 users to have their own training and target inputs. The real 
time test data is also processed in the same way for testing the 
performance of the classifier.  
7.2.  SELECTION  OF  KERNAL  FUNCTION  AND 
PARAMETERS  
They are six no of different kernels available which are are 
linear , polynomial, Gaussian RBF, linear spline, linear bspline, 
and  exponential  RBF  if  the  kernel    function  is  selected 
differently then svm will produce different outputs.  
Values for „ker‟ can be selected from any of the following 
kernel functions 
  Linear  
` v u k             (3) 
  'bspline'(p1 is degree of bspline) 
          2 ^ 2 / exp 1
` p v u v u sqrt k           (4) 
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Fig.2. SVM Classifier 
7.3. DESIGN OF SVM CLASSIFIER  
The  SVM  Classifier  is  designed  as  in  Fig.2  for  the 
classification  process.  The  data  is  preprocessed  and  it  is 
converted into a feature vector X of size 100x2 and the target 
vector Y is created with the size 100x1. Feature vector and target 
vector  is  given  to  the  SVM  classifier.  The  kernel  function  is 
selected  from  the  available  list  of  six  kernel  functions.  The 
number of classes is fed to the classifier.  The No of classes are 
two +1 for masquerading block and -1 is for non-masquerading 
block. The input is first given to a single user and the remaining 
users are also classified in the same  manner. The Results are 
shown in Table.2 for a representative set of users.    
Table.2. Classification Results of Support Vector Machine 
(Linear Kernal) Classifiers (SD – Standard Data, RTD – Real 
Time Data) 
Sl. No.  User 
Classification Accuracy 
SD  RTD 
1  User 3  88.13  98.13 
2  User 14  52.58  45.19 
3  User 21  65.59  74.59 
4  User 24  99.89  100.00 
5  User 38  100.00  78.32 
6  User 41  98.56  97.52 
Table.3. shows the classification result of standard data and 
real time data using SVM-L classifier for different users. Real 
time data instances are classified better than the standard data. 
Table.3. Classification Results of Support Vector Machine 
(Linear BSplineKernal) Classifiers (SD – Standard Data, RTD – 
Real Time Data) 
Sl. No.  User 
Classification Accuracy 
SD  RTD 
1  User 3  97.19  95.15 
2  User 14  49.52  68.19 
3  User 21  64.82  100.00 
4  User 24  99.88  88.42 
5  User 38  95.52  100.00 
6  User 41  98.59  94.58 
 
8.  ENSEMBLE  DESIGN  OF  MASQUERADER 
DETECTION SYSTEMS 
In  the  Ensemble  design  each  classifier  is  designed 
individually for classifying the users as either Masquerader or 
non  Masquerader.  Ensemble  design  of  masquerader  detection 
system is shown in Fig.3. 
 
Fig.3. Ensemble Design of MDS 
Decision  trees  are  used  for  classifying  the  user  as  either 
normal or abnormal based on the information gain value. Based 
on the calculated information gain the user will be classified as 
normal as abnormal. Support Vector Machines with six kernel 
functions  is  used  for  classification.  Among  the  available  six 
kernel functions the linear and linear bspline are the functions 
which  is  applicable  for  all  the  available  users.  Also  Support 
Vector Machines with this kernel functions classifies the users in 
a very shorter duration of time.  So these three classifiers are 
designed separately and their outputs are observed. A threshold 
value  between  2  to  5  is  assigned  for  each  classifier.  The 
Ensemble  Design  of  Masquerader  Detection  Systems  receives 
input from each classifiers output and based on the threshold 
value the user will be finally classified as normal or abnormal.  
If a user is classified as normal with high threshold value by one 
or more than one classifier then the user is actually classified as 
normal user by Ensemble classifier. Otherwise the user will be 
classified as abnormal. The Table .4 Shows the Classification 
Accuracy of Standard and Real Time data for the selected set of 
users. The Ensemble Design classifiers are found to be better for 
many users than individual classifiers. Since all the classifiers‟ 
outputs are taken along with the threshold value, the Ensemble 
Design classifier will give better results. 
Table.4. Classification Results of Ensemble Design Classifiers 
(SD – Standard Data, RTD – Real Time Data) 
Sl. No.  User 
Classification Accuracy 
SD  RTD 
1  User 3  99.25  99.45 
2  User 14  88.19  81.29 
3  User 21  70.15  75.97 
4  User 24  99.98  100.00 
5  User 38  99.79  89.52 
6  User 41  99.56  93.19 
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9.  OUTCOMES  OF  THE  RESEARCH  & 
COMPARISON 
Table.5 and Table.6 shows the performance results of User3 
& User 24 for all the classifiers for Standard and Real time data 
set.  The  Table.5  shows  the  classification  results  of  all  the 
classifiers  for  user3.  From  the  Table.5  it  is  observed  that 
Ensemble Design classifiers perform better than other classifiers. 
The classification rate is  found to be better for the Ensemble 
Design classifiers. For each and every user and for real time data 
or standard data the classification rate will be different. Table.6 
is shown for user24. User24 is best classified by the Decision 
Tree  and  Ensemble  Design  Classifiers  for  Real  and  Standard 
data.  
Table.5. Performance Results of User 3 
Sl. No.  Data set  DT  SVM 
(L) 
SVM-
LBSP  ED 
1 
SD  98.13  88.13  97.19  99.25 
RTD  99.15  98.13  95.15  99.45 
Table.6. Performance Results of User 24 
Sl. No.  Data set  DT  SVM 
(L) 
SVM-
LBSP  ED 
1 
SD  100.00  99.89  99.88  99.9 
RTD  85.41  100.00  88.42  100 
Table.7. Selection of Best Classifier for the Representative set of 
users (BC –Best Classifier, CR- Classification Rate) 
Sl. No.  User 
SD  RTD 
BC  CR  BC  CR 
1  U3  ED  99.25  ED  99.45 
2  U14  ED  88.19  ED  81.29 
3  U21  ED  62.37  SVM 
-LBSP  100 
4  U24  DT  100  SVM 
(L)  100 
5  U38  SVM 
(L)  100  ED  89.52 
6  U41  SVM 
-LBSP  98.59  DT  98.41 
Table.7 shows the best classifier for each and every set of 
user‟s standard and real time data. User 38 is best classified with 
Support Vector Machines Linear Classifier for standard data and 
using  Ensemble  Design  Classifier  for  Real  Time  data.  The 
classification  rate  is  found  to  be  100.00%  and  89.52  % 
respectively. This result is repeated for all the users and the users 
are classified using different algorithms using Ensemble Design. 
The best classifier for the representative set of users and their 
classification rate is mentioned in the Table.7 for the standard 
and real time data. ED classifier gives the best classification rate 
for user 3 for both standard and real time dataset. ED classifier 
results the best classification for standard dataset of user 21 and 
SVM-LBSP  results  the  best  classification  rate  for  standard 
dataset of user 21. In Ensemble of classification best classifier is 
used for classification.    
 
Fig.4. CR comparison for Standard data 
Fig.4.  show  the  performance  comparison  of  classifiers. 
SVM-l classifier results the overall CR as 82.34 and SVM-LBSP 
results  the  83  and  DT  results  89  and  ED  produce  the  high 
classification rate of 92.37 percentage.  
 
Fig.5. CR comparison for Real-time data 
Fig.5. shows the performance comparison of classifiers for 
real time data. SVM-l classifier results the overall CR as 81.24 
and SVM-LBSP results the 90.02 and DT results 79.34 and ED 
produce the high classification rate of 93.48 percentage.  
10. KEY FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH  
This research outlines the following key findings  
  The users of the standard and real time data differ in 
behaviour 
The  user  21  of  standard  data  is  best  classified  using 
Ensemble Design with the classification rate of 62.37%, whereas 
the User 21 of Real Time data is best classified using Support 
Vector Machines (LBSP) classifier with the classification rate of 
100.00%. So for the blocks of user 21 either Ensemble Design or 
Decision Tree classifier will be employed.  
  The decision tree classifiers perform best for minimum 
number of users 
  The support vector machine with two kernel functions 
performs better than Decision Tree classifiers  for the 
available users.  
  Ensemble Design gives best classification for most of 
the users in Real Time and Standard Data.  
From  the  table  it  is  observed  that  the  Decision  Tree 
Classifiers  gives  best  classification  for  2  users  and  Support 
Vector Machines with Linear or Linear BSpline classifiers gives 
50
60
70
80
90
100
SVM-L SVM-
LBSP
DT ED
C
R
Classifier
CR
50
60
70
80
90
100
SVM-L SVM-
LBSP
DT ED
C
R
Classifier
CRISSN: 2229 – 6956(ONLINE)                                                         ICTACT JOURNAL ON SOFT COMPUTING, JANUARY 2011, ISSUE: 03 
137 
 
best  classification  for  4  users  and  the  Ensemble  Design 
classifiers gives best classification for total of 6 users. Even for 
the other users the Ensemble Design classifiers perform well.  
  The developed Ensemble Design offers best detection 
of the blocks of commands of the users in Standard and 
Real Time data and thereby we can better classify the 
users as normal or Masquerader user.  
 
Fig.6. Ensemble Design of MDS 
Fig.6. shows the MDS for different users. Standard and real 
time data are input to the preprocessing.   
11. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes Ensemble Design to classify the normal 
user and Masquerader user Decision Trees and Support Vector 
Machines  are  used  for  classifying  the  normal  users  from  the 
abnormal users Support Vector Machines shows better results 
than  Decision  trees.  The  Ensemble  Design  gives  better 
classification  accuracy  than  the  other  two  classifiers.  The 
detection rate of real time data set is found to be low since the 
users are from diversified community The detection rate can be 
still improved by using sophisticated data collection strategies 
and by including the hackers in the user community, So that we 
will  have  more  number  of  masquerading  blocks  for  the 
experiments The detection rate can also be improved by using 
the  combination  of  machine  learning  algorithms  Some  of  the 
suggested  algorithms  are  Genetic  algorithm  and  Fuzzy  Logic 
Genetic  algorithm  can  be  used  for  optimizing  the  number  of 
commands to a reasonable and reduced count and thus reducing 
the time taken for classification Fuzzy logic can be used to write 
more precise rules with Fuzzy Associative Memory enabling the 
accuracy  of  the  classifiers      This  work  can  be  extended  to 
various SVMs and with different parameters.  
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